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Search Warrants in Newsrooms: Some
Aspects of The Impact of Zurcher v.
The Stanford Daily
By DwIGr L. TEETER, JR.*
and
S. GRIFFIN SINGER**
Speaking before a Congressional hearing in 1978, CBS
News Vice President William J. Small summed up journalists'
concerns about the Supreme Court ruling in Zurcher v. The
Stanford Daily.' "In journalism," Small said, "we always as-
sumed that the Bill of Rights protected us from an arm of the
State intruding into our working atmosphere without sub-
poena, without our having the opportunity to seek legal means
to fight off the intrusion. The Supreme Court says no."
'2
The Zurcher decision stemmed from a fact situation in-
volving the search of a newsroom, but the implications of that
5-3 ruling extend far beyond the news media. Simply stated,
the Court ruled that surprise searches of newsrooms are consti-
tutional as long as the police have a valid warrant. Beyond
that, the evident meaning of Zurcher is that all citizens,
whether or not they are suspected of any crime, may be sub-
jected to unannounced searches of their homes or offices, pro-
vided only that those searches are approved in advance by the
issuance of a search warrant. The gravity of that decision's
impact on the American press-and on the ordinary American
citizen - was suggested by Jerry W. Friedheim, executive vice
president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association,
* Professor and Chairman, Department of Jdumalism, The University of Texas
at Austin. A.B. 1956, M.J. 1959, University of California at Berkeley; Ph.D. 1966,
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
** City Editor, The San Antonio Light, and formerly Associate Professor and
Assistant Chairman, Department of Journalism, The University of Texas at Austin.
B.J. 1955, M.A. 1972, The University of Texas at Austin.
1 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
2 Statement of William J. Small, in JusTicz DPARTmENT PoLICY CONCERNING
NEWS MEDIA SEARCH WARRANTs, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Session 208 (1978)
p. 8. [Hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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in a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Constitution.3 He pointed to the contrast between those coun-
tries where neither the press nor the people are free4 and Amer-
ica, where it has been accepted historically that a free press is
essential to a free people. Friedheim underscored the danger of
the Zurcher decision: "[P]ress freedom here lives, but . . . it
lives in peril and in constant need of defense by the press itself,
the people and the peoples' representatives in Congress."'
News media reactions to Zurcher expressed outrage based
on the fear that a "staggering blow to freedom of the press" had
been struck.' The consensus of press comments was that sur-
prise searches of newsrooms are clearly unconstitutional under
the first and fourth amendments. In addition to the fear that
surprise searches of newsrooms would impede the gathering of
information from confidential sources, the press displayed con-
cern that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects"7 had been eroded.
This article explores the Zurcher decision in terms of how
the Court interpreted and applied the fourth amendment. It
then analyzes press reaction to the rule enunciated in Justice
Byron R. White's majority opinion that unannounced searches
of innocent third parties, including persons in newsrooms, are
constitutional when a search warrant has been issued. Justice
White suggested that such third parties could be protected
from such surprise searches through "legislative or executive
efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possi-
ble abuses of the search warrant procedure."" Attempts to pro-
vide a legislative response to Zurcher, including more than a
dozen bills introduced in the Ninety-Fifth Congress,9 generally
News Release, American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Reston, Va., July 13,1978
(excerpting remarks of Mr. Friedheim before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Constitution).
4'Id.
I See text accompanying notes 36-49 infra for a discussion of the press reaction to
Zureher.
The Right to Rummage, The Washington Post, June 1, 1978, reproduced in
Hearings, at 208.
7U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
436 U.S. at 567.
See, e.g., H.R. 12952, H.R. 13017, H.R. 13113, H.R. 13168, H.R. 13169, H.R.
13227, H.R. 13305, H.R. 13319, H.R. 13710, S. 3164, S. 3222, S. 3258, and S. 3261.
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adopted District Court Judge Robert F. Peckham's position as
stated in a 1972 ruling in that case. Peckham asserted that a
subpoena duces tecum, as a "means less drastic" than a search
warrant, "should always be preferred" in "obtaining materials
from a third party."' 0 The news media, however, have not
waited passively for legislative action to lift the threat of news-
room searches. As will be shown, the news gathering process
has been altered as a consequence of the Supreme Court ruling
in the Zurcher case.
I. THE Zurcher DECISION AND ITS SETING
Zurcher arose during violent demonstrations at Stanford
University on April 9, 1971. Students protesting the firing of a
black janitor took control of the Stanford University Hospital
administrative offices and an adjoining corridor. Demonstra-
tors barricaded both ends of that corridor, but police forced
their way through the barricade. A group of nine police officers
stationed at one end of the hallway was overrun by students
seeking to avoid arrest."
On Sunday, April 11, 1971, a special edition of The Stan-
ford Daily carried articles and photographs depicting the clash
between demonstrators and police. Based on the newspaper's
coverage of the incident, authorities surmised that Daily pho-
tographer Bill Cook had been in a suitable position to take
additional photos of the fighting between students and police.
It was assumed that the Daily might have some pictures in its
files which would allow police to identify some of the demon-
stators in order to bring charges against them.
2
Accordingly, the local district attorney secured a warrant
on Monday, April 12, 1971, in which a municipal judge author-
ized the immediate search of the premises of The Stanford
Daily. Later that day, the newspaper office was searched by
four police officers, with some staffers present. Daily Editor
Felicity Barringer tried to convince searching officers that if
J0 353 F. Supp. 124, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
" 436 U.S. at 550. Part of the narrative which follows is adopted from H. NELSON
& D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS, 642-43 (3d ed. 1978), and is used by
permission of the Foundation Press, Mineola, N.Y.
12 Address by Professor Marion Lewenstein, of the Dept. of Communication, Stan-
ford University, to Auston Chapter of Stanford Alumni Ass'n, Oct. 26, 1978.
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she had possessed any action photos which presented identifia-
ble views of the demonstrators, those pictures would have been
published in the newspaper. The search, which extended to
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste
paper baskets, but not to locked rooms, failed to yield the
photographic materials sought by the officers. Rather than pro-
ducing photographs which would aid police in identifying par-
ticipants in the riot, the search merely uncovered photographs
previously published in the Daily. ,3
The Stanford Daily, shortly after the search, filed suit in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search
violated the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments. A dis-
trict court, in ruling the search unconstitutional, declared that
the fourth and the fourteenth amendments forbid the issuance
of a warrant to search for materials in possession of a person
not suspected of a crime unless there is probable cause to be-
lieve, based on a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum
would be impractical. 4 A subpoena duces tecum "can be en-
forced by a judge only after a hearing in which the holder of
the evidence has the opportunity to present arguments why the
material should not be given to the government." ,5 If investiga-
tors have a search warrant, on the other hand, the holder of the
documents "has no more warning than a knock on the door"
or the actual arrival of police in a newsroom. District Judge
Peckham was emphatic in ruling for the Daily. He stated that
a subpoena duces tecum is always preferable to a search war-
rant in obtaining evidence from a "third party," one not sus-
pected of involvement in criminal activity.'"
A United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court ruling'7 that the search violated the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, but the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed by a vote of five to three.' 8 Justice White's majority
opinion held that newspapers are subject to unannounced
' 436 U.S. at 551-52.
" Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
,s Weaver, High Court Bars Newspaper Plea Against Search, The New York
Times, June 1, 1978, § A at 1; quote at § B at 1.
11 353 F. Supp. at 130.
, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Justice Brennan took no
part in the consideration of this case.
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"third party" searches such as the one involving the Daily.
Terming the district court's treatment of the case a "sweeping
revision of the Fourth Amendment," Justice White declared
that "under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to
search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party,
at which there is probable reason to believe that fruits, instru-
mentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found."'" "The criti-
cal element in a reasonable search," he continued, "is not that
the owner of the property is suspected of a crime but that there
is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be
searched for and seized are located on the property to which
entry is sought.""0
Justice White's analysis of first amendment implications
of the Zurcher case yielded the conclusion that "the net gain
to privacy interests by the District Court's new rule would not
be worth the candle."12 The Court noted the "general submis-
sion . . . that searches of newspaper offices for evidence of
crime reasonably believed to be on the premises would forbid
use of search warrants and would permit only the subpoena
duces tecum." He enumerated the arguments against news-
room searches, including physical disruption which could
impede timely publication, and the contention that confiden-
tial sources of information will dry up. Other contentions
against searches included reporters' fear of searches deterring
them from recording and preserving their notes for future use
and the possibility that the press may resort to self-censorship
to conceal its possession of information from police.22 Justice
" 436 U.S. at 554, 556 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 556.
21 Id. at 562.
2 First, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that
timely publication will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of informa-
tion will dry up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various
events because of fears of the participants that press files will be readily
available to the authorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from recording
and preserving their recollections for future use if such information is subject
to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its dissemination will be
chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal editorial delibera-
tions. Fifth, the press will resort to self-censorship to conceal its possession
of information to [sic] the police.
436 U.S. at 563-64.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
White, with seeming casualness, brushed such arguments
aside.
He then proceeded to consider the historical development
of the fourth amendment, 23 conceding that "the struggle from
which . . . [it] . . . emerged 'is largely a history of conflict
between the Crown and the press."' He wrote that in "issuing
warrants and determining the reasonableness of a search, state
and federal magistrates should be aware that 'unrestricted
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for
stifling liberty of expression.' 21 4 Justice White cautioned that
"[w]here the materials sought to be seized may be protected
by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude."'2
Such a standard was said to be sufficiently rigorous when
"properly administered" to protect newspaper offices from the
dangers imposed by search warrants. In actuality, however,
that "scrupulous exactitude" standard requires only that the
"preconditions for a warrant - probable cause, specificity with
respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized"
be met.
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, dissented from the majority opinion's view that properly
issued search warrants were adequate to safeguard first amend-
" For an excellent study on that methodology, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
24 436 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted). The standard work on the development of
the fourth amendment is N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1924); and Yackle, The
Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 336, 336 (1978).
1 Justice Lewis Powell concurred, he said, "simply to emphasize. . . the funda-
mental error of Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion." Like Justice White, he found
no constitutional reason to entitle the press to a special procedure. He suggested,
however, that the Court might, in the future, consider a somewhat different method
for newspaper searches as opposed to searches of cars or apartments. Powell wrote,
"[t]his is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient to support the search
of an apartment . . . would be reasonable in supporting the search of a newspaper
office." A magistrate "asked to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and
should take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First Amendment
- such as those highlighted by Mr. Justice Stewart - when he weighs such factors."
Application of the reasonableness and particularity requirements in issuing search
warrants, wrote Justice Powell, should minimize dangers to the press. 436 U.S. at 568-
70.
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ment freedoms. In addition to the "physical disruption of the
operation of the newspaper," Justice Stewart was concerned by
a "more serious burden." He saw unannounced police searches
of newsrooms as raising "the possibility of disclosure of infor-
mation received from confidential sources, or of the identity of
the sources themselves.""6
The majority of the Court was not convinced that news-
room searches would cause confidential sources to disappear or
would impel the press to suppress news because of fears of
searches.17 Such a conclusion, Justice Stewart argued, ignores
common experience and "will significantly burden the consti-
tutionally protected function of the press to gather news and
report it to the public."" Agreeing with District Judge Peck-
ham's statement that a "subpoena should always be preferred
to a search warrant, '2 9 Justice Stewart contended that the
Court should adopt the subpoena method and its "opportunity
for an adversary hearing. 30 His goal was to provide a newspa-
per an opportunity for such a hearing, before the search has
occurred and before "the constitutional protection of the news-
paper has been irretrievably invaded."
3'
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting separately, rejected
the majority approach and also turned away from Justice Stew-
art's emphasis on the press as opposed to the general public.
Justice Stevens instead favored a broader emphasis on
"whether the offensive intrusion on the privacy of the ordinary
citizen is justified by the law enforcement interest it is in-
tended to vindicate. ' 32 He argued that the majority's holding
that "mere possession of documentary evidence" is sufficient
to satisfy the probable cause requirement of the fourth amend-
ment "rests on a misconstruction of history and of the Fourth
Amendment's purposely broad language."33 Justice Stevens
agreed with Justice Stewart that "[t]he standard of reasona-
28 Id. at 571-73 (citations and footnotes omitted).
27 Id.
21 Id. at 574.
2 353 F. Supp. 124, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3o 436 U.S. at 576.
31 Id.
2 Id. at 581.
= Id.
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bleness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the
showing of justification match the degree of intrusion."'
For the innocent citizen's interest in the privacy of his papers
and possessions is an aspect of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Notice and an
opportunity to object to the deprivation of a citizen's liberty
are, therefore, the constitutionally mandated general rule. An
exception to that rule can only be justified by strict compli-
ance with the Fourth Amendment.-
Justice Stevens added that the only possible justification
for an unannounced search of an "innocent citizen is fear that,
if notice were given, he would conceal or destroy the object of
the search."'35 In this case, he maintained, no such showing
had been made. Therefore, the search of The Stanford Daily,
in his opinion, violated the Warrant Clause of the fourth
amendment.
II. REACTIONS To Zurcher: DiD THE PRESS "CRY WOLF"?
The involvement of The Stanford Daily in the search war-
rant case did not escape the nation's media. Loudly, the press
decried the action of the Court in editorials and columns and
before Congressional subcommittees. While most of the initial
outcry was based on threats to press freedom, the media also
recognized that the rights of private citizens were being jeop-
ardized. Some observers might feel that the press was "crying
wolf" in its reactions, particularly in light of Justice White's
reassurances about warrants being issued with care by neutral
magistrates. The press did not evidence much faith in his con-
tentions.
The Washington Post, while terming the decision a
"staggering blow to freedom of the press," also noted the tre-
mendous impact of the decision on the rights of all citizens. As
The Post interpreted Justice White's majority opinion,
if the public can convince a judge there is probable cause to
believe evidence of a crime is contained in your private files
'Id.
"Id.
". Id. at 582.
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- a crime not committed by you or by anyone, anytime,
anywhere - they can rummage through your papers and
premises until they find it, or choose to abandon the search.16
The Post declared that such an assault runs counter to
both the first and fourth amendments. Until recent years, pri-
vate papers were considered immune from the prying eyes of
government. To illustrate the dramatic consequences of the
Zurcher decision, the Post said that "in a situation like Water-
gate . . .a newspaper (or its reporters) would be foolish to
retain documentary evidence that might reveal the sources of
its information.
' '37
The Boston Globe, in an editorial column written by Exec-
utive Editor Robert Healy, pronounced the decision to be the
most devastating first amendment case ever to come from the
Supreme Court. Because the record clearly demonstrated that
police authorities have little trouble in obtaining search war-
rants, Healy argued that the "press will then be perceived in
certain quarters as an adjunct of any government agency which
might be able to obtain a search warrant. '38 Further, the deci-
sion was said to encourage a "lawless process where police
agencies can go in and rifle through internal memoranda, un-
published articles and notes, and files of newspapers."'
The New York Times said the decision "strikes a double
blow, at individual privacy and press freedom," adding that
privacy rights for law-abiding citizens were "shabbily
treated."3 The Times contended that there was no precedent
for Zurcher because the precise issue had never been before the
Supreme Court. 0 This newspaper called for legislatures "to
enact added protections for individual privacy and press free-
dom. . . .Considering the way this Court now interprets the
Fourth Amendment, Congress and the state legislatures would
34 The Right to Rummage, The Washington Post, June 1, 1978, reproduced in
Hearings, supra note 2, at 208.
3 Id.
Court ruling devastating to Press, The Boston Globe, June 2, 1978, reproduced
in Hearings, supra note 2, at 209.
39J Id.
11 A Double Blow by the Court, The New York Times, June 6, 1978, reproduced
in Hearings, supra note 2, at 210.
40 Id.
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be well advised to do so promptly."4
The Wall Street Journal was in complete agreement with
Justice Stevens' rejection of a "press only" application of the
first amendment, favoring a larger emphasis on the rights of
ordinary citizens.42 The Journal said that "[n]ewspapers are
on the firmest ground. . . when their rights are embodied in
rights enjoyed by all the people."4 It was conceded for argu-
ment's sake that in situations where materials could be de-
stroyed easily, there could be merit in an unannounced search
to protect valuable evidence. The J6urnal, however, was trou-
bled by the spectre of "police bursting into private premises
under any but the most compelling circumstances."44
The heart of the problem, to The Wall Street Journal, was
the 1967 Supreme Court ruling in Warden v. Hayden45 that
"mere evidence can reasonably be the object of such a
search."'45 ' The Journal was referring to Justice Stevens' fram-
ing of the issue in Zurcher as the "kind of showing that is
necessary to justify the vastly expanded degree of intrusion
upon privacy that is authorized by the opinion in Warden v.
Hayden. 4 The Journal thus approved Justice Stevens' asser-
tion that when an "innocent citizen's interest in the privacy of
his papers and possessions" is at stake, "[n]otice and an op-
portunity to object to the deprivation . . . are, therefore, the
constitutionally mandated general rule. '47 The Journal said
that the Court's ruling in Zurcher, instead of announcing a
41 Id.
42 See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of Justice Steven's
dissenting opinion.
41 Search and Seizure, The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1978, reproduced in
Hearings, supra note 2, at 215.
44 Id.
Is Id. The Supreme Court case that expands the scope of search warrants to
include more evidence is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Justice White made
the point in his dissent that "Until 1967, when Warden v. Hayden was decided, our
cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment had drawn 'a distinction between merely
evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the
authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and
on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumen-
talities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen
property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and
property the possession of which is a crime." 436 U.S. at 579, n. 5 (citation omitted).
"I Search and Seizure, the Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1978, reproduced in
Hearings, supra note 2, at 215.
436 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 581.
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strict standard of compliance with the fourth amendment when
the privacy of an innocent citizen is threatened, "serves as an
open invitation to skirmishes between the state and the
press." The Journal added:
If the Stanford case does lead to a rash of newspaper
searches, we suspect the court will have to look at the Fourth
Amendment again. It could strengthen the privacy rights of
everyone against evidence-gathering raids without having to
do newspapers a special favor. 9
Did the media overreact? As noted in the following section,
as of late 1978, at least fourteen other searches had been con-
ducted in offices of newspapers and broadcast stations since
The Stanford Daily search in 1971.
lI. PROFILING THE "NEUTRAL MAGISTRATE"
If Justice White's majority opinion in Zurcher were to be
taken at face value, any journalist who sees search warrants as
a threat to press freedom is worrying needlessly. After all,
"neutral magistrates" will protect the news media from harass-
ment, and will require reasonable searches, specifically spelled
out as to what places will be searched and what things will be
sought. 0 That majority holding, however, as viewed by the
press and by Justices Stewart and Stevens, imperils "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects.""'
Justice White stated that when "[p]roperly adminis-
tered, the preconditions for a warrant. . . should afford suffi-
cient protection against the harms that are assertedly threat-
ened by warrants for newspaper offices."52 Those preconditions
have to do with neutral magistrates issuing warrants on the
basis of probable cause for believing that the fruits or evidence
of criminal activity will be found on the premises to be
searched.
"9 Search and Seizure, The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1978, reproduced in
Hearings, supra note 2, at 215.
41 Id.
436 U.S. at 581.
"U.S. CONST. amend IV.
52 436 U.S. at 565.
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Journalists should perhaps be forgiven if they regard the
protection of "neutral magistrates" as illusory. First, most, if
not all, journalists tend to believe the folklore item about police
walking around with fill-in-the-blank search warrants already
signed by a complacent magistrate. Even if that is rankest
slander of the judiciary, statistics on the issuance of search
warrants compel the belief that the preconditions for warrant
issuance are often improperly administered. "From 1969
through 1976, police sought 5,563 applications for search war-
rants under the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act. Only 15 of
these applications were denied. In 1977, none of the 626 appli-
cations was denied."53 Bluntly, the general rule seems to be
that a search warrant sought equals a search warrant granted.
Beyond that, the term "neutral magistrate" puts an all too
flattering gloss on some persons who are empowered to issue
search warrants. The House Committee on Government Opera-
tions has noted that the Court's implications that "magistrates
.. .have at least a working knowledge of constitutional law"
is in error. "By one estimate of the National Center for State
Courts, 8,800 of the 14,900 judges and comparable officials in
states are not attorneys, and "a number of states appear not
to require that warrant issuers be lawyers."54
There are situations when judges may not be neutral on
the subject of whether, when presented with the relevant infor-
mation, a search warrant should issue. NBC News Correspon-
dent Bill Monroe has expressed doubts that there is
"dependable protection in the restraint of judges and law en-
forcement officials." This restraint may be lacking particularly
when the judges "are . . .the subjects of journalistic inquiry,
and sometimes the political allies of others being investi-
gated."55 Monroe articulated fears that "the Court has now
delivered to [judges and officials] a tool they can use against
their investigators."" Similar apprehensions were expressed by
Jack C. Landau of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
q, HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE EFFECTS
OF THE STANFORD DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).
11 Id. at n.8.
sl Quoted in Congress Moves on 13 Bills to Limit Searches, News Media & The
Law, Oct., 1978, at 19.
56 Id.
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Press. In an eloquent and alarming account of some weaknesses
in warrant issuance procedure, Landau testified before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
We regret the theories put forth in Stanford Daily that
there is any effective way to limit the damage suffered by a
news organization subjected to no-notice surprise searches.
First, politically appointed or elected magistrates are not an
adequate safeguard for the First Amendment interests of
press organizations whose historical function is to expose the
corruption and misdeeds of the very political structure of
which the local magistrate is an integral part.
Second, a number of the most celebrated confidentiality
cases have involved news organizations or news reporters who
have refused to disclose confidential information indicating
that court orders have been broken. In a number of cases,
reporters have been held in contempt and have gone to jail
rather than comply with these subpoenas. As criminal con-
tempt is itself a crime against the court, it is unrealistic to
assume that a local judge - when a crime has been commit-
ted against his authority - is going to serve as an effective
guardian of the privacy of the newsroom. 57
IV. LEGIsLATIVE REACTION To Zurcher
Subpoenas of reporters, variously seeking the identity of
their sources, their notes, tape recordings, or videotape "out-
takes," emerged as a palpable threat to the newsgathering pro-
cess back in 1972 with the Supreme Court decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes.5 1 In that case, the Supreme Court held for
the first time that reporters do not have a first amendment
protection against answering questions put to them by grand
juries. In a large number of cases since Branzburg, the issue has
been whether journalists can live up to a pledge of confidential-
ity to protect the identity of a source." Without the ability to
keep sources' identities secret - or to protect materials which
might reveal a source's identity or other information which was
5, Landau, Statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, July 13, 1978, quoted in COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. Nov./Dec., at 45.
"' 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
" For a valuable summary of subpoena cases, see J. GOODALE, COMMUNICATIONS
LAw 297-490 (1978). Note particularly cases cited at 306-13.
1978-791
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a condition of gaining the confidence in the first place - many
reporters assert that they will be hampered significantly in
gathering news.6"
Search warrants are quite another matter. A warranted
search can be made of a newsroom without prior warning. To
a journalist, the difference between a subpoena and a search
warrant is analogous to the difference between a rattlesnake
and a cobra. One at least gives some warning. Many journalists
believe that the lack of security of notes and materials will
frighten off some important sources for news stories.6 A strik-
ing example was presented in a memorandum from The Boston
Globe's religion editor to Executive Editor Robert L. Healy.
The religion editor had been working on a story about "how a
so-called religious organization is raising funds and using
young people and how parents of some of these young people
are trying to get them to return home. 62 The memo was dated
June 21, 1978, just three weeks after the Zurcher decision by
the Supreme Court:
Yesterday morning... I received a call in response to a story
published recently under my by-line in the Globe. The caller,
who did not identify himself and who was calling from a pay
phone, was seeking further information on the subject of my
story.
In the course of our conversation, it became clear that
this person had information about a significant aspect of my
first story and while trying to answer his questions in a gen-
eral way, I pressed him about meeting with me to discuss the
matter further and to establish his credibility. The caller said
he needed to protect his anonymity and I assured him I would
do my best to preserve it if we met. The caller said he would
discuss the possibility with his superiors.
This morning, the same person called, again from a pay
phone . . . .The caller said his superiors had told him that
I could not protect his anonymity because of the new law,
which it became clear, referred to the recent Supreme Court
ruling.that permits issuance of search warrants on newspaper
offices. Again I told him we would do our best to preserve his
1o See Section II supra at notes 32-34, 40-41 for statements by journalists.
61 Id.
12 Hearings, supra note 2, at 4.
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anonymity and after some more conversation about the sub-
ject of my first story and his involvement, the caller said he
might call again sometime .
3
As Healy's anecdote indicates, the "chilling effect" of
Zurcher on news sources is not an illusion. The majority opin-
ion by Justice White, after denying that search warrants would
be disruptive of newsrooms, offered the comfort that legislative
remedies might be provided: "the Fourth Amendment does not
prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to es-
tablish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of
the search warrant procedure. ... 64
But the legislative process is often a painfully slow rem-
edy, whether through the state legislatures or the Congress. At
the state level, California has enacted a statute to prevent
searches of news media offices for materials protected under
the state's shield law. In Assembly Bill 512, signed into law
September 23, 1978, by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., phys-
ical evidence is not exempted. However, reporters' notes,
sources, photos, and file out-takes are to be protected. In paral-
lel action, the assembly also passed a bill placing a constitu-
tional amendment on California's 1980 ballot. That measure,
if passed, would incorporate protections granted under the Cal-
ifornia shield law into the state constitution.
6 5
In Oklahoma, a new shield law went into effect October 1,
1978. It provides that reporters may not be required to divulge
either the source of any:
published or unpublished information, or the information it-
self, unless "the court finds that the party seeking the infor-
mation or identity has established by clear and convincing
evidence that such information or identity is relevant to a
significant issue in the action and could not with due dili-
gence be obtained by alternate means."6
Information from the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press indicates that Ohio, one of 26 states with shield laws,
8 Id.
" 436 U.S. at 567.
6" 47 U.S.L.W. 2228; Report of the Advancement of Freedom of Information
Committee, THE SocIEry OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS/SIGMA DELTA CHI (1978) pp. 7-
8.
," Id.
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is seeking to amend its statute to protect not only journalists'
sources but also documents and papers in a newsroom.17 A bill
pending in Pennsylvania would protect journalists' papers from
searches, and Texas has adopted a statute which requires that
only those courts in which judges are required to be attorneys
may issue search warrants. In addition, another new Texas
statute protects newsrooms from, searches."'
At the federal level, thirteen bills restricting search war-
rants were introduced in the Ninety-fifth Congress. 9 Basically,
the federal bills fall into two categories: the first forbids "third
party" searches when no crime is suspected without first taking
alternate measures such as subpoenas to secure the desired
evidence. This kind of bill states specifically that news organi-
zations are protected from such searches under the first amend-
ment.70 The second category prohibits such searches only for
news organizations. All but two of the proposed laws would
apply to both federal and state jurisdictions. 7' The bills em-
brace the "subpoena first" rule articulated by Judge Peckham,
and limit searches of innocent third parties to circumstances
where there is reason to believe the evidence will be destroyed.
As expected, search warrant legislation to protect the press has
been introduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress.
CONCLUSION
It is to be hoped that Congress will pass legislation to
abrogate the menace to press freedom represented by Zurcher.
Meanwhile, the newspaper, broadcast station, or news service
must cope with the possibility - or probability - of unan-
nounced newsroom searches by police. Several news media
organizations have adopted procedures for employees to follow
in the event that such searches occur.
17 Telephone interview with Brona Pinnolis, Reporters Committee on Freedom of
the Press, Nov. 29, 1978; 47 U.S.L.W. 2228.
IN Id. Texas measures amending §§ 18.01 and 18.02 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure [Senate Bills 1202 and 2091] were signed into law in June, 1979, by Gover-
nor William Clements.
n H.R. 12952, H.R. 13017, H.R. 13113, H.R. 13168, H.R. 13169, H.R. 13227, H.R.
13305, H.R. 13319, H.R. 13710, S. 3164, S. 3222, S. 3258, and S.3261.
10 Id.; telephone interview with Barbara Ruud, legislative aide, office of the Hon.
J.J. Pickle, M.C.
11 See citations in note 69 supra.
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Within two weeks after the Zurcher decision, attorney
Douglas H. McCorkindale of The Gannett Co., Inc. circulated
a memorandum to editors and publishers within the group's
seventy-eight newspapers. McCorkindale, senior vice president
for finance and law for Gannett, recommended that should
police arrive unannounced, full cooperation should be ex-
tended, so long as the warrant appears reasonable and proper.
Such cooperation should include the immediate production of
desired material, or the informing of police that the material
is not present in the newsroom. Why so much cooperation after
all the cries from the press? The idea, although difficult for
many journalists to swallow, is to get the officers in and out of
the newsroom as quickly as possible to prevent rummaging in
what could be confidential and private files.
7 2
McCorkindale wrote that warranted searches should not
be resisted physically for fear of arrest or a contempt citation.
He noted that while cooperating, journalists should- do every-
thing possible to challenge the warrant through appropriate
legal process:
We recommend that each newspaper, in cooperation
with its local counsel, develop a plan which would permit the
newspaper to seek quick reversal of a warrant. The plan
would identify those judges with power to reverse a warrant
along with their office and home telephone numbers. You can
probably decide in advance which judges would be most
likely to rule in your favor on the validity of a warrant. When
a warrant is served, you should immediately contact local
counsel and the corporate legal department. Your local coun-
sel can then telephone an appropriate judge and request a
verbal order reversing the warrant, or staying its execution
until a hearing can be held. At the hearing you can attempt
to persuade the court that the warrant was not legally proper.
Due to time constraints or the unavailability of local
counsel, it may be necessary for editors to talk directly with
judges. As part of your contingency planning, you and your
local counsel should decide what you should say in that
event.7 3
72 McCorkindale memo, Warranted Searches of Newspaper Offices, Gannett Co.,
Inc., Rochester, N.Y. June 13, 1978. (Used by permission.)
3 Id.
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United Press International and The Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, as examples, also have guidelines set out for employ-
ees. Both call for editors and counsel to examine warrants. UPI
directed that personnel who are capable of evaluating the mer-
its of a specific search request with "common sense, good judg-
ment, knowledgeability and an appreciation of local conditions
and laws" be previously designated.7 The Star and Tribune
guidelines spell out in detail what questions should be asked
by editors and counsel and how police should be accompanied
by an appropriate editor and an attorney from The Star and
Tribune legal office, assuming that the searchers can be per-
suaded to wait for the appropriate editor and lawyer to arrive. 75
Other newspapers call for photographers to accompany police
during the search in order to get a pictorial record of what files
and desks are being searched.6
So far, courts and law officers seem to have overlooked a
major problem of access to materials other than those on film,
tape or paper - even if police have a valid search warrant. In
other words, do they know - in the parlance of newsroom "new
technology" - how to "access information" stored in a news-
paper or wire service computer?
In the modern world of newspapers and news services, re-
porters and editors often never deal in words on paper once
crude notes are transcribed. All of the information, most likely
in memo or story form, is then stored in a computer system and
is visible on the screen of a video display terminal (cathode ray
tube). If a reporter, for example, is not specifically named in a
warrant and directed to produce the notes or unpublished
story, it might prove impossible for the information to be re-
trieved except by specially trained editors or technicians.
Computer systems demand that before access is allowed to
secured files, a password must be given. When an unpublished
story or other information is of an extremely sensitive nature,
a cautious reporter may devise a password which is known to
no one else, thus thwarting tampering with the information. In
such a case even if an editor were willing to cooperate, that
1, UPI Reporter, Nov. 2, 1968.
15 Search Warrant Procedure Guide Issued, EDrroa & PUBLISHER, Aug. 19, 1978,
at 18.
79 Id.
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editor would be unable to help police "frisk" the computer.
Will the news media be intimidated and thus made less
effective in reporting information the public needs to know?
Only time can provide an answer, and it remains to be seen
whether Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily will spawn an epidemic
of newsroom searches. After the Stanford search, a certain
amount of uneasiness was generated, and the Supreme Court's
1978 decision has resulted in what seemed unthinkable a few
years ago: contingency plans for dealing with search warrant-
authorized police intrusion into newsrooms.
It can be speculated, however, that newsroom practices in
dealing with sensitive stories and the keeping of notes and
other materials have now been altered. Saving notes for future
reference or for use in developing continuing stories is no longer
a routine matter, and will not be unless the Supreme Court
reverses Zurcher or unless specific legislation insures once
again the newsroom privacy which, like oxygen, used to be
taken for granted. For the present, the widely republished pho-
tograph of a police officer pawing through a desk at The Stan-
ford Daily back in 1971 haunts journalists. What couldn't hap-
pen here . . . happened here.
1978-79]

